 RDL Homepage |
 Table of Contents |
 Document Information |
|
RDL Homepage |
Table of Contents |
Document Information |
Appendix F
Stability and Support Operations
This appendix applies stability and support operations (SASO) doctrine to aviation brigade commanders, their staffs, and brigade operations. The primary focus of Army aviation is warfighting. However, aviation brigades possess capabilities that apply to peace, conflict, and war; therefore, aviation units may be directed to deploy and conduct SASO. FM 100-5, FM 100-19, and FM 100-20 are the Army’s primary doctrinal references for SASO.
F-1. PERSPECTIVE
a. The Army classifies service activities during peacetime and conflict as SASO. Peacetime activities can occur either in continental United States (CONUS) or outside CONUS (OCONUS) environments. Examples of peacetime activities include—
b. Conflict can also occur in both CONUS and OCONUS environments. Examples of operations in conflict are—
c. In SASO, Army aviation units conduct combat, CS, and CSS missions. No new Army aviation missions have developed as a result of SASO. There is, nevertheless, a requirement for aviation units to train to the conditions under which they will operate. Therefore, aviation brigade commanders must obtain as much information as possible about the conditions surrounding the SASO; they must adapt training programs to meet mission requirements. Examples of different type conditions may include—
F-2. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
a. SASO may require the deployment of the entire aviation brigade or only elements of the brigade. The C2 headquarters normally is a function of the size of the aviation deployment package. The aviation unit/element may be designated as the C2 element for additional forces. Further, it may be attached to another headquarters for operational purposes. These higher headquarters may include another brigade/division/corps headquarters, an Army Forces (ARFOR) headquarters, or a joint task force (JTF) headquarters.
b. Frequently, SASO focus on missions that require the efforts of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Because of the attention the missions listed below receive during SASO, CS and CSS units frequently will be the main effort; combat units become the supporting effort. These units work with US and foreign civilian agencies of government, international organizations, and private organizations. Examples of US Army aviation SASO CS/CSS operations include—
F-3. SASO PRINCIPLES
a. Army aviation doctrine has long been based on well-established principles of war. SASO also have principles that guide the commander's actions. The relative application of each principle varies, depending on the specific operation. Aviation brigade commanders must understand the implications of these principles by virtue of the fact that they may be designated as task force commanders in an SASO. The SASO principles are as follows:
(1) Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
(2) Unity of effort. Seek unity of effort toward every objective.
(3) Legitimacy. Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.
(4) Perseverance. Prepare for the measured, protected application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
(5) Restraint. Apply appropriate military capability prudently.
(6) Security. Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.
b. FM 1-100, FM 71-100, FM 100-5, and FM 100-20 further expand on the principles of SASO.
F-4. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Once tasked to execute SASO, the aviation brigade commander initiates the planning process. This planning process continues throughout the entire mission. Listed below are factors that will help in planning SASO.
a. Mission Analysis.
(1) The brigade staff receives the OPLAN/OPORD from the next higher headquarters. The staff then analyzes the mission relative to appropriate theater strategy, campaign plans, and concept plans (CONPLANS).
(2) The theater strategy, if available, articulates the commander-in-chief's vision for the theater. It provides guidance, direction, and opportunities for peacetime activities in general terms of ends, ways, and means. Campaign plans and CONPLANS identify theater objectives, sustainment concepts, needed resources, and specified and implied tasks. Supporting plans developed by headquarters above the aviation brigade level provide more definitive guidance on essential tasks.
(3) The aviation brigade commander should be able to—
(a) Articulate the aviation brigade's mission to subordinate commanders.
(b) Define all specified and implied tasks.
(c) State what the current end-state of the mission is perceived to be.
(4) The aviation brigade commander should plan for at least a 6-month rotation for any SASO despite what the current mission-duration is forecast to be.
b. Task Organization. Task organization is METT-T dependent; often it is modified by political considerations. The aviation brigade commander—
(1 ) Is the one best able to determine aviation-peculiar mission requirements as the division/corps aviation officer.
(2) Must assess the brigade's organizational assets and any expected attached assets for the mission.
(3) Must determine if the task force is equipped to meet all the specified and implied tasks of the mission.
(4) Must take part in the initial development of all OPLANs/OPORDs relative to the mission.
c. Command and Control Relationships.
(1) The aviation brigade—or elements of the aviation brigade—may not deploy with the next higher headquarters; therefore, C2 relationships must be established early on. In certain circumstances, elements of the brigade may be placed under OPCON of another US agency. Specific date/time groups for C2 transfer should be requested if not provided by higher headquarters.
(2) A clear understanding of the C2 relationship will help reduce confusion throughout the entire preparation and deployment phases of the operation. In addition, units designated for attachment to the aviation brigade must clearly understand the date/time when C2 transfers from their owning headquarters to the aviation brigade or an element of the aviation brigade.
d. Advance Party Operations. Advance party personnel need to—
(1) Have a comprehensive overview of their unit's mission.
(2) Fully understand the intent of their commander and the gaining commander.
(3) As aviation brigade representatives, see and understand every facet of the operation.
(4) Be prepared to be the conduits for information flow between the gaining command and home station.
(5) Be prepared to receive and understand instructions/guidance from the gaining command.
(6) Transmit this critical information back to the home station commander.
(7) Be prepared to request/coordinate with the gaining command that which is necessary to ensure a smooth and orderly inflow of personnel and equipment.
(8) Be prepared to provide/receive information on the following subjects:
(a) Unit deployment status. Upon arrival in the deployment AO, the most important information to the gaining command may be the deployment status of the inbound unit. Advance party personnel must be prepared to—
(b) US military/Host nation in-processing procedures. US military or host nation administrative procedures may require the arriving units to in-process at the port of debarkation.
1 This in-processing may include—
2 Advance party personnel should advise their units if this process is impending upon arrival. In addition, prior coordination must be conducted at the deployment site/port of debarkation to facilitate an orderly flow of personnel/equipment into the AO.
(c) Helicopter staging area. Helicopters arriving by AMC support will need to be reconfigured for mission capability after off-loading. Advance party personnel should request ramp space with easy maintenance vehicle/equipment accessibility. Maintenance test flight airspace for the post reconfiguration phase also must be requested/coordinated through the appropriate authorities.
(d) Petroleum, oils, and lubricants. POL needs to be coordinated in synchronization with aircraft/ground vehicle arrival at the sea port of debarkation (SPOD)/air port of debarkation (APOD). Also fuel resupply either at the operating base or forward operating base needs to be planned and coordinated. Advance party personnel need to know—
(e) Maintenance. Advance party personnel need to know what the status of AO Class IX repair parts will be on the deploying units arrival date. This information may help the deploying commander as far as the transportation of certain aircraft within the unit. The deploying commander may need to know what facilities will be available upon the arrival of the unit.
(f) Life support/Billeting. Incoming personnel arrival numbers may exceed, or be expected to exceed, Class I stockage previously shipped by the unit. If so, Class I iterms may have to be requested/coordinated. Billeting space must be coordinated for the arriving elements. Within an AO, advance party personnel may have to request/coordinate—
(g) Radio frequencies/Flight following procedures. Advance party personnel need to—
(h) Forward operating base (FOB) coordination. The aviation unit may be tasked to occupy an FOB. If so, advance party personnel must—if at all possible—conduct reconnaissance operations; they specifically should consider—
e. Split-Based Operations. The full integration of supply and transportation functions into a vertical distribution system is critical. Logistics management functions may be conducted from the deploying unit's home station theater. Only those functions critical to the operation are conducted in the deployment AO. This is called split-based operations. These type operations call for elements of the materiel management center (MMC) to remain at home theater locations; force-projection cells deploy to an AO with the force they support. The deployed MMC cells consist of personnel and equipment in modular components. These components provide a conduit for electronic transmission of logistics data. The rear MMC continues to support the stay-behind force; at the same time, it interfaces with the forward-deployed cells. Split-based operations apply to all logistics functions. The aviation brigade commander assesses the capabilities and assets of the logistics support network; he then provides input at both the planning and execution phases, as needed, to assure the mission is accomplished.
f. Deployment. SASO deployments deserve special consideration. (SeeApp E, this manual, and the Army Aviation Deployment for Contingency Operations planning guide.) Many times the aviation brigade,or elements of the aviation brigade, will deploy alone—not as part of a larger division/corps operation.
(1) Therefore, the aviation brigade commander must ensure that—
(a) The deploying unit(s) continue to receive the division/corps level of attention needed to facilitate a smooth deployment process.
(b) The deploying unit(s) are fully supported during their preparation for deployment and deployment phases.
(2) Examples of when the aviation brigade commander can influence this type support include—
(a) Reduction/elimination of external taskings once the unit has been tasked to conduct the SASO.
(b) Increased maintenance support to bolster aircraft and ground vehicle operational readiness (OR) rates.
(c) Additional personnel support for low-quantity military occupational specialties (MOSs) fills either for the deploying elements, the rear elements, or both.
g. Lines of communication (LOCs). LOCs are all the routes—land, water, and air—that connect an operating military force with a base of operations along which supplies and military forces move. Maintaining uninterrupted logistics support throughout all phases of an operation is the central challenge of logistics. The aviation brigade commander must view logistics as an implied task from operation-start to operation-finish. He specifically should consider aviation LOCs to include—
(1) En route POL (if self-deploying).
(2) En route and deployment AO communications with home station.
(3) Prepositioned Class I, III, and V in the deployment AO upon arrival.
(4) Technical support en route and in the deployment AO upon arrival.
(5) Security at debarkation sites and along routes to FOBs.
h. Force Integration. The aviation brigade commander—
(1) Can expect the brigade—or elements of the brigade—to conduct SASO in joint, multinational, and separate agency—government and nongovernment—type environments.
(2) Should be aware of several operational considerations as aviation brigade forces prepare to execute SASO:
(a) First, the airspace C2 structure probably will be based on joint procedures modified to host nation constraints. This may result in positive and/or procedural control changes; it may require relatively quick adaptation on the part of US Army aviators.
(b) Second, all US and non-US personnel must understand procedures for operating in and around US Army aircraft. Reciprocally, all US military personnel must understand procedures for operations around multinational ground and aviation forces. Authorizations allowing transportation of non-US military personnel need to be coordinated before AO arrival. In addition, pre-flight passenger briefings need to be comprehensive and standardized.
(c) Third, an Army aircraft tasking procedure needs to be set in place as soon as possible. Preferably, it should be set in place before the arrival of the aviation main body. This probably will be a higher level staff function; however, it will be critical to initiation of operations early in the mission.
i. Force Protection. The aviation brigade must consider force protection as an implied task throughout the operation. External security assets must be task organized with the brigade (or elements of the brigade) before deployment or attached immediately upon arrival at the AO. Ground security should include routes between the aviation FOB and all related LOCs. The size of the ground security force depends on many variables. Some of these include—
(1) The isolation or remoteness of the aviation assembly area at the FOB.
(2) An enemy situation.
(3) Any terrorist activities.
(4) The civilian attitude towards US military presence in the area.
(5) A friendly force situation.
j. Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE are designed to control the application of force. These rules stipulate under what conditions US soldiers can defend against, or attack, an existing threat. Normally, the ROE are restrictive. The ROE will be prepared and issued by a higher headquarters before any of the aviation brigade elements deploy to the AO. The aviation brigade commander—
(1) Must clearly understand the ROE—specifically in the light of aviation operations.
(2) Must be prepared for ROE to change at any time during an operation.
(3) Must brief all ground and aircrew personnel on the ROE again upon arrival at the port of debarkation/ISB.
(4) Should consult with the brigade staff judge advocate (SJA) representative and/or the corps/division SJA for ROE assistance.
(5) Should plan for an SJA representative to deploy with the force.
k. Liaison Activities. Higher echelon mission requirements may require the assignment of aviation liaison personnel to higher/adjacent headquarters as well as international and foreign government organizations. Therefore, the aviation brigade commander—
(1) Must be prepared to release personnel for these functions. (This may require him to request augmentation to support this expanded liaison requirement.)
(2) Should plan to attach at least one liaison officer to each higher level Army component headquarters within the larger task force to prevent subsequent shortfalls or gaps within the unit. (These officers should be able to discuss the doctrinal aspects of Army aviation, operations, and logistical support.)
(3) Reciprocally, should request liaison support from all elements (US and foreign) that may affect accomplishing the unit's mission. (Liaison officers should deploy with their own transportation and communications assets.)
l. Host Nation Considerations.
(1) The following procedures/restrictions can vary in every country in the world:
(2) The aviation brigade commander must be prepared to adapt the unit to the host nation operating environment. Serious problems/complications can develop when host nation requirements are not being met by the force; they can result in further restrictions or even mission failure.
m. Redeployment.
(1) During SASO, local/national forces operating in the AO may, or may not be, pro-US military presence. The presence of US military forces may be perceived as a stabilizing factor. Moreover, friendly local/national forces may see the departure of US military forces as not being in their best interest. To show the need for continued US military force presence, pro-US factions may increase hostile actions against an identified threat.
(2) Therefore, the aviation brigade commander—
(a) May expect an increase in hostilities between pro-US factions and anti-US factions as announcements—formal or informal—are circulated about the departure of US forces.
(b) Should enact a heightened level of security during these times.